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Military readiness is fundamental to national security.
In itself, readiness has many connotations depending on the
perspective of the individuals participating in the opera-
tional arena. Some strategists subscribe to spending the
limited defense resources on a few systems that press the
state-of-the-art in order to gain strategic advantage.
Others feel the limited resources would be better spent on
obtaining more equipments that have been proven. What the
two have in common is both strategies require the equipment
to be supportable.
It has long been obvious that support problems are a
limiting factor on the operational capability of any system.
Unlike the past, where logistic considerations were made
after the item was produced and placed into service, the
current concept emphasizes the importance of trading off
operational and support requirements at the very beginning
of the life cycle. DoD Directive 4100. 35G states: "Over
the life cycle of a system, support represents a major por-
tion of the total cost, and is sometimes the principal cost
item." Integration of logistics considerations into the
Integrated Logistics Support, Implementation Guide For
DoD Systems and Equipment
,
NAVMAT P-.4 00 0, p. UTT.

conceptual planning and through the design process of a wea-
pon system can reduce operational support costs significant-
2ly without a degradation of operational availability.
Since ILS is a relatively new concept that represents a
substantial departure in both philosophy and implementation
from previously used systems, there is a lack of educational
material to supplement a course of instruction in ILS. Cur-
rent directives contain an abundance of information relating
to the theory of ILS, however, only minimal historical ma-
terial is available that addresses the application of this
theory into real world situations. Specifically, there is
a need for material of the self contained case study type
that highlights implementation problems.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this paper was to investigate an on-
going program that implemented the governing ILS instructions
and develop a case study around the major problems that have
confronted the logistics manager during the initial stages
of the life cycle. The case study is designed primarily
as an educational aid in presenting ILS to a group of Naval
officers in the systems acquisition course of instruction
at the Naval Postgraduate School. A secondary objective is
to provide a source of historical data.
2Ibid. i p. IV-1.

C. METHODOLOGY
A NAVAIR project was chosen for investigation because it
was identified as one of the better Navy ILS programs and
the company exhibited a willingness to openly discuss im-
plementation problems. Additionally there were several
unique features about the particular program which lend ap-
plication to other acquisitions. These features will be
addressed in a later chapter.
The data required to meet the objectives of this paper
were obtained through personal interviews of both the con-
tractor and Navy project office personnel. A total of
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It was felt that those being interviewed would be more can-
did in their discussions if the threat of publication was
removed, therefore, neither the company nor the project will
be identified. The strength of this technique is apparent.
The investigator has a better opportunity to obtain informa-
tion that potentially could embarrass the organization or
individuals, however, it is not without its weak points.
The major weakness with this technique lies in the fact
that the data collected merely represents the opinions of
individual's interviewed. Furthermore, opinions can be
quite parochial and biased in viewpoint, particularly if an
individual has been intrenched in the job for any length of
time
.
The case study method of instruction was chosen since it
was determined to be the best method for applying practical
problems in the relm of ILS management. Part of the learn-
ing process is utilizing information in a way which will
get participants personally involved in taking responsi-
bility for action in concrete situations of things, people,
and events. It provides a method of getting at the strate-
gic point of action from which one may call on any and all
relevant science and knowledge to develop solutions to prob-
lems which must be overcome to achieve the goals for which
an ILS manager must take responsibility.
The learning of ILS management is a unique process un-
like the learning in other fields. A search of the ILS
literature by the authors has revealed that, in general,

there is no vast body of laws or theories for a student to
master which will enable him to prosecute a successful pro-
gram in ILS. Instead there is a body of principals which
can best be conveyed through situational application.
Enlarging one's understanding of subjects in ILS man-
agement does not necessarily follow the same process of
isolation and control as in the subjects of laboratory
science. The process is more of clarifying the strategic
elements in specific situations. Perhaps the most important
feature of the case method for training ILS managers is that
it is situational, for the ILS manager is always dealing
with a situation. Each problem is affected by the tradi-
tions of the organization in which it arises, the practices
of the profession involved, and the relationships among the
program officers and contractor personnel. Through presen-
tation of related situations, the case method is an excel-
lent tool for learning about ILS management.
D. SEQUENCE OF PRESENTATION
Chapter I contains introductory material including in-
formation on need for the study, its objectives, and scope
of the study.
Chapter II deals primarily with the background material
relating to the study. It contains a brief history of ILS
for students with limited background in logistics and can
be easily omitted by those that have had an introduction to
project management within the Navy. The latter section of
10

the chapter contains a brief overview of the ILS areas in
which a student should be familiar in order to obtain maxi-
mum utility from the case study.
Chapter III discusses significant ILS innovations in-
itiated in the program investigated. The important fea-
tures of these innovative techniques are described so that
future ILS managers might profit from their potential value.
Chapter IV is a synthesis of the opinions of various
ILS managers interviewed during the investigation for this
study. The authors feel that potential ILS managers may
benefit from these lessons learned.
Appendix A contains the case study. It was developed
around the repair/discard decision that was a central issue
in the avionics support area. The situations described are
intended to increase the students awareness of the problems
involved in implementing support policies.
Appendix B contains notes to assist the instructor in
guiding the discussions toward dealing with the central
issues of the case. The appendix has limited distribution
but may be obtained from: LCDR E. A. Zabrycki, Code 55Zx,
Department of Operations Research and Administrative Sciences,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93940.
11

II. BACKGROUND AND THEORY
A. HISTORY
Historically, logistics has had very little glamour and
has been relegated to secondary status utilized only when a
specific need or emergency arose. During World War II and
for a period of years thereafter, national defense strate-
gic planning was geared to maintaining a good mobilization
base. The planning was based on the assumption that ade-
quate time would always be available to bring the nations
productive power to full force and that the country would
be able to maintain at least an adequate defense until such
time as it was accomplished. In this atmosphere, attention
was focused primarily on production and delivery of weapon
systems. The responsibility for support was often over-
looked or given only cursory consideration. Likewise, the
total cost of support received little attention.
A weapon system's cost is composed of two primary ele-
ments -- acquisition costs and ownership costs. The latter
costs are often overlooked, which ignores the significant
point that operations and maintenance (0§M) costs, for the
most part, far exceed the development and investment costs
3
E. J. Shaughnessy, "Development of Integrated Logistic
Systems and Equipment," Planning and Research Corporation,
November 1964, p. 5.
Samuel P. Huntington, "The Functions of the Military
Establishment," The Annal of the American Academy of Politi -
cal ' Science
,
March 1973, p. 3.
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(PAMN) . The current estimate is about a three to one ratio
(3:1). 5
In an effort to curb these rising costs and to bring
them into proper perspective, the Department of Defense in-
troduced the concept of Integrated Logistic Support with the
issuance of DoD Directive 4100. 35G. Implementing directives
were subsequently issued by the Department of the Navy, as
indicated in Figure 1. The ILS concept as developed in
these directives has essentially three prime purposes:
1. To insure all designated elements of support are
identified and provided for early in the hardware develop-
ment cycle.
2. To insure that the hardware is capable of being
maintained by personnel on beard and reliable enough to meet
operational requirements.
3. To consider possible cost and/or performance trade-
offs early in the development cycle.
Integrated Logistics Support has been aptly called the
life cycle management. Implicit in the definition, logis-
tics planning should begin with initial design of the weapon
system since this design significantly influences the magni-
tude and type of support required. Logistic planning that
begins after design of the system can ultimately result in
higher cost and a degradation of system effectiveness.
Axtell, G. C, "Designating an Integrated Logistics
System," Defense Industry Bulletin
,
July 1969, p. 23.
. Department of Defense Directive 4100. 35G , "Integrated
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Early interface between the design engineer and the logis-
tician is thus recognized as being essential. In the
implementing directives, the acquisition manager is made
responsible for establishing such relationships and agree-
ments within the Defense Establishment as will enable him
7
to carry out his logistic support tasks. These directives
(Figure 1) recognize that the ILS concept requires that all
decisions made in the initial design and development shall
take into account accompanying logistic considerations.
The relationship depicted in Figure 2 further indi-
cates that it is important for both design and support fac-
tors to be taken into account as early in the life cycle as
possible. This permits any desired changes to be made
prior to entering into actual production, beyond which
changes become much more costly. Considering the overall
impact on system objectives, it is imperative that the ac-
quisition manager and logisticians have an appreciation for
techniques discussed in this paper.
B. PRIMARY ILS CONSIDERATIONS
1 . Logistic Requirements Analysis
An important point in the preceeding discussion is
that life cycle costs of military systems has now been
7Naval Material Command Instruction 4000. 20A , "Inte-
grated Logistic Support Planning Policy," p. 3, 18 March
1971.
Ibid.





































































recognized as involving the "total cost incurred by the
government from the moment the investigation of its gen-
erating idea elicits manpower usage, within or without
government, until every piece of the equipment is eliminated
o
from the military logistics system." The function of log-
istics requirements analysis is now considered to be as
important as producability or performance.
The recognition that logistic costs are fixed by the
weapon design has resulted in current DoD emphasis on trade-
off evaluations for determining and achieving design char-
acteristics of the end item which reduce the logistic support
burden. To make ILS work, the tools must be provided for
developing the economic consequences for each program
deci sion
.
Logistic Requirements Analysis begins early in the
life cycle during specification writing and concept formu-
lation. At this point it is less costly to rectify mistakes
and adjust design objectives. The trade-off studies are
more meaningful since they influence a broader set of spec-
ifications at the operational and support levels.
In making support trade-offs, it is imperative the
analysis address operational needs that cover specific ele-
ments. The DoD Planning Guide 4100. 35G defines these ele-
ments as:
9 Logistics Management Institute, "Life Cycle Costing in
Equipment Procurement," p. 2.
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a. The Maintenance Plan
b. Support and Test Equipment
c. Supply Support
d. Transportation and Handling
e. Technical Data
£. Facilities
g. Personnel and Training
h. Logistics Support Resource Funds
i. Logistics Support Management Information.
Early stages of Logistic Requirements Analysis is
comprised primarily of developing models that will generate
the quantitative data necessary in planning for the various
elements. A significant step in the analysis occurs when
personnel with specialized experience examine the proposed
design to determine the supportability impact. Apparent
logistic deficiencies identified or recognized at this time
are fed back into the design iteration.
The major output from the Logistic Requirements
Analysis is a maintenance plan which provides the founda-
tion for coordinated action by both the customer and the
contractor's organizations.
2 . Organi zation
The objective on an Integrated Support Plan, as
defined in DoD Planning Guide 4100. 35G, is to achieve and
maintain a specified system effectiveness throughout a wea-
pon systems program life cycle at a minimum of logistics
•support cost. In order to achieve this end there must be
18

a management process that centralizes the ILS efforts and
assigns responsibilities to the different functional groups
in both the government and contractor organizations.
In view of this, the organizational structure is a
key element if a successful program is to be pursued.
Typically, program managers are chartered by the Systems Com-
mands and have the overall responsibility for the acquisi-
tion of the weapon system. It is important that the program
manager have a clear understanding of integrated logistic
support policies and requirements, however, it must be
recognized that his prime concern is to deliver hardware
that meets specific performance requirements within a pre-
determined time and budget constraint.
To insure ILS requirements are effective the program
manager appoints an assistant for logistics (APML) who func-
tions as the coordinator for all logistic requirements.
The APML may be organically assigned to the project or, in
the normal case in the Navy, to the functional logistics
chain. As such, he is responsible for the organization,
implementation, and management for the ILS program and
exercises technical and administrative coordination authority
of the element managers. Logistics Element Managers (LEM)
may be assigned on either a part or full time basis to a
p. 4
Naval Material Command Instruction 4000. 20A, op. oit.,
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specific system but physically remain with the parent or-
ganization. For example, the LEM for training is organi-
zationally assigned to NAVAIR - 04, (Commander Logistics/
Fleet Support) , but may be responsible to a specific APML
for a particular weapon system.
The cornerstone for logistics management is vested
in the Integrated Logistics Support Management Team (ILSMT)
.
It is chaired by the APML and composed of members through-
out the Naval establishment who represent activities respon-
sible for the planning, development, and management of
logistic support resources. A typical team from Naval Air
Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) would include personnel from
the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) , Naval Air Rework Facil-
ities (NARF's), APML, LEM's, and the contractor logistics
support organization.
The ILSMT conference provides a forum for the re-
view, modification, and approval of the ILS plan. Function-
al area subgroups initiate problem documentation through an
"action chit" system. Action chits are reviewed by the
ILSMT chairman, contractor, and executive committee for
resolution. Chits approved for action designate the respon-
sible activity and a deadline for accomplishment. Upon
completion of the action the ILS plan will be revised.
From the preceeding discussion it is apparent that
integrated logistic support is dependent upon individuals
from diverse organizations whose form, location, responsi-
bilities, and modus operandi are the product of many factors
20

The integration of logistic support then becomes a problem
of working across a very complicated matrix through the use
of telephone calls, routed correspondence and briefings.
3. Maintenance Engineering Analysis (MEA)
A focal point or integrating force for ILS manage-
ment and support requirements is maintenance engineering
analysis. As evidenced by Figure 3, it is the data source
for all functional organizations. MEA consists of an
engineering review of system design configuration whose
purpose is threefold:
a. to identify the support implications of design,
b. to provide feed-back to the designer by which
a more supportable design can be selected,
c. to document the specific support actions re-
quired and the resources necessary to effectively carry out
those actions.
MEA is an iterative process throughout the life
cycle. The maintenance engineering program encompasses a
two part analysis effort. Part I concerns design influence
and guidance; Part II identifies specific quantitative and
qualitative support requirements in response to the data
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(i) Support Equipment Requirements.
It is apparent from the above list that the MEA is
quite comprehensive and with a slight expansion in some
areas, has multiple applications in the acquisition process.
As an example, it was pointed out during the investigation
for this study that the government pays for the same data
several times because of the lack of communication between
the functional organizations. ASO buys data for use in
provisioning models, Naval Air Technical Services Facility,
(NATSF) , buys data for use in publications, and management
buys data for the information systems. Although not within
the scope of this paper, it is conjectured that the MEA is
the logical data source for all these requirements.
4 . Repair/Discard and Level of Repair Decisions
One of the important design trade-off decisions is
whether to design a particular item to be repaired or dis-
carded at failure. This decision impacts upon support
resources (technician numbers, skill levels, spares and
repair parts, facilities, test and support equipment, and
maintenance information), as well as the specific maintenance
actions to be taken and at what levels repairs are to be
made. The decision also affects such system and equipment
design attributes as safety, reliability, accessibility,
test points, control, displays, and human factors.
Naval Air Systems Command AR-5U Addendum 54
,
"Integrated
Logistic Support Program Requirements," p. II-3, 4 February 1972
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Repair/discard decisions are particularly important
for avionics systems and equipments. The extensive develop-
ment of solid state devices and integrated circuits has made
possible the high package densities for modular packaging.
These techniques have resulted in quantum improvements in
reliability and production efficiencies. Consequently dis-
12card-at-failure is an economic reality today.
Repair/discard decisions may be classified into two
types. The first is design orientated for application in
the late planning phases of the system and sorts the items
into three distinct categories: those that are clearly dis-
card, those that must be repaired, and those for which the
13
analysis is not definitive. If the item is repairable,
diagnostic test points must be designed into the equipment
to fault isolate down to the failed component. If an item
is to be designed as discard-at- failure , only end-to-end
(go/no-go) test points would be necessary. The second type
of repair/discard decision is a level of repair decision.
It involves the operational phase after the design has been
completed. Level of repair is concerned with optimizing
the maintenance and support levels at which repairs are
most economical to effect. The question to be answered is
Defense Documentation Center Report AD4Q5779 , "Criteria
for Discard-at-Failure Maintenance," by E. G. Wrieden, p. 1-3,
March 1963.
Kline, Melvin B., "Maintainability Considerations,"
UCLA Short Course
,
p. 45-46, June 1973.
24

whether it is more economical to repair the item at the
local level or at a rear support level.
Interaction between repair/discard decisions and
other systems design efforts identify five major points in
the life cycle where repair/discard decisions might be logi-
cally made. The first occurs during concept formulation and
systems definition. It depends upon operational, mainte-
nance, and logistic support policies as well as cost-effec-
tiveness and other economic criteria established during
concept and system studies. At this level, repair/discard
decisions are primarily broad policy decisions which become
part of the overall maintenance and logistic concept. They
collate into a set of quantitative and qualitative system
specification criteria to guide design engineers in the
development phases.
The second decision point occurs during engineering
development or item selection. The policies and criteria
previously established are now applied to assemblies, sub-
assemblies, and modules based upon the analysis of the cost
models. The third decision point occurs during late design
and early production phases and is concerned with initial
source coding and provisioning. At this point the major
design decisions have been made, therefore, logistic support
decisions such as range and depth of spares, the effect on




transportation and pipeline effects, numbers and locations
of test and repair stations, and similar decisions should
be considered.
The forth decision point is a design review that
occurs during the operation and support phases of system
deployment. Previously established repair/discard decisions
are reviewed for validity based upon historical operation
and support data collected from field use of the system/
equipment. Such a review may result in a change in the
repair/discard decision, or at what level to repair, or it
may involve a modification of the design. The final deci-
sion point analyzes the worth of repairing as a result of
damage, age, wear, or other conditions. It answers the
question, when is it more economical tc throw the item over
the side in lieu of transporting it back for repair.
It must be recognized that the quantitative values
of most decision criteria are dependent upon a variety of
design and support decisions other than repair/discard.
These are extremely difficult to aggregate into an economic
model. Furthermore, there are other factors that are not
quantifiable. A partial list of these are as follows:
•
• probable gain in equipment reliability through
elimination or repair; that is, decrease the
adverse effects of technicians accidently in-
juring equipment;




probable savings in development cost and manu-
facturing because of the elimination of the
need for accessibility within the throwaway
module ;
.
reduction in unit cost by the manufacture of
larger quantities;
reduction in cost of training, supporting tech-
nicians, and facilities;
release of repair facility floor space for other
uses;
use of facilities for priority repairs rather
than indiscriminate queries for many items;
emotional feelings that discarding complex units
is wasteful;
loss of reliability information when trouble
shooting of the component part is eliminated;
stowage space requirements about half of that
required under a repair policy;
lack of use of current facilities;
loss of some capability of the forward echelon
to react to emergency situations. Spares short-
ages become more critical unless emergency re-
pair is provided for;
logistic cost of discard items themselves.
The above listing is an indication of the problems
involved in constructing a model. Some logisticians advo-
cate that a decision to repair vice discard (even if slightly
arbitrary) allows the most flexibility and the least risk al-
ternative. If an early decision is to discard, then later
changes to repair, problems arise. Some of the problem areas
include the time lag to acquire repair capability, additional
data requirements, additional support equipment requirements,




5 . Planning and Scheduling
All projects require some form of planning and
scheduling. This effort may be done almost unconsciously
for small projects, however, major undertakings such as ILS,
require the conscious integration and coordination of many
functional elements and diverse organizations. The prob-
lems of planning and scheduling an effort of this magnitude,
particularily in the later stages of development, where
changes are being made, can become overpowering.
As described by a group of ILS managers in NAVAIR,
the problems associated with ILS' plans can be categorized
into four basic groupings:
a. Plans are sometimes developed and stated
different level than the one required for the execution of
the plan. The plans that are developed at a weapon systems
level or end item level vary widely with the planning re-
quirements and amount of detail necessary at the subsystem
level. When a plan of action is at .a different level of
detail then the actual execution of the plan, management
visibility and control can be seriously hampered.
b. Plans are sometimes oriented toward individual
logistic elements, particularly within a matrix organization,
and integration of these elements into an overall logistic
plan is difficult. The timing and quality of action is dif-
ficult to identify in separate plans which may result in the
loss of effective management control.
28

c. ILS plans are difficult to update if the element
plans are developed independently. The functional orienta-
tion of element plans provides an avenue to keep them up-
dated within themselves but their impact on other elements
is difficult to recognize. Additionally, element plans are
usually developed by hand and manually maintained. Updating
can be quite time consuming.
d. In ILS planning it is difficult to recognize
the gradual buildup of in-house repair capability that
actually occurs during the acquisition process. For example,
an intermediate maintenance activity may have the capability
to remove and replace shop replacable assemblies (SRA's)
long before it can repair these items. The actual capability
is developed incrementally until the maintenance plan is
finally realized.
While the above problems may be highlighted in the
ILS area, they are common in one form or another, to most
planning and scheduling efforts. Network techniques can be
used successfully as a tool to minimize these problems.
Network techniques establish the interrelationships and in-
terdependencies of all the activities within a program and
can provide the manager with an integrating mechanism in
which to evaluate their impact on the total program. Fur-
thermore, the use of network planning can be easily mecha-
nized for updating and retrieval of information.
The proper ILS planning and scheduling system pro-
vides the logistic manager with a tremendous increase in
29

capability for the management of an ILS program. The system
not only allows early visibility of potential problems, it
can also arrange these problems in order of priority accord-




As the authors reviewed the program there appeared to
be several significant innovations initiated in ILS manage-
ment that have applications in future acquisitions. Three
of these are:
1. ILS Test and Evaluation.
2. Floating Support Date.
3. RILSD.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the important
features of these innovative techniques so that future ILS
managers might profit from their potential value.
A. INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT TEST AND EVALUATION
Historically, testing of weapon systems has primarily
been design oriented with a limited emphasis on test and
evaluation of ILS. The ILS program for a weapon system/
equipment is of significant financial importance and holds
sufficient potential impact on the operational availability
of the system that a logistics evaluation needs to be con-
ducted on equal priority with the evaluation of hardware
and performance characteristics. For various reasons, full
advantage has not been taken of this opportunity during past
programs
.
An ILS evaluation of a weapon system is incrementally
accomplished throughout the various phases of Navy Prelim-
inary Evaluation (NPE) , on-aircraft Maintenance Engineering
31

Analysis (MEA) , and Board of Inspection and Survey Trials
(BIS)
. This evaluation encompasses the following elements
of ILS and verifies the necessity and requirements for
follow-on testing during future increments of the ILS
evaluation:
• Technical Data




• Ground Support Equipment
• Maintenance Plan.
Organizationally an ILS evaluation team is comprised of
technically-oriented personnel from the following Navy
activities and operates during designated evaluation times
under the direction of the Naval Air Test Center (NATC)
,
with reporting responsibilities to NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR-410):
NATC Patuxent River, Maryland (Service Test Center)
NAVWPNENGSUPPACT (Naval Weapons Engineering Support Center)
NAILSC (Naval Aviation Integrated Logistic Support Center)
NAVPRO (Naval Plant Representative Office and RILSD)
FIT (Fleet Introduction Team)
NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT (Naval Air Systems Command Represen-
tative, Atlantic)
NAMTGRU (Naval Air Maintenance Training Group)
NAVAIRREWORKFAC (Naval Air Rework Facility)




The function of the ILS evaluation team is to combine
the expertise of the Navy organizations involved into one
coordinated group with the common objectives of:
CI) Providing more intensive coverage of ILS during
the test and evaluation phases of the weapon system.
(2) Eliminating or reducing overlapping or redundant
testing.
(3) Providing early cross training of fleet and develop-
ment personnel, i.e. Fleet Introduction Team.
(4) Providing a unified Navy position of ILS defi-
ciencies, requirements, and status.
Since the ILS evaluation occurs during the events of
NPE and concludes with the BIS Trials, goals are established
for each of the evaluation events. All available ILS ele-
ments are assessed during each event by describing observed
compatibility with that which was planned, the identity of
the deficient areas, an assessment of the contractors com-
pliance with AR-30, and the need for follow-on evaluations.
Due to the differences between test/evaluation and op-
erational environments, the ILS evaluation is essentially
qualitative in nature rather than quantitative. However,
where possible quantitative data is provided to indicate
magnitude from which value judgements can be made on the
predicted values of mean time between failure (MTBF)
,
reliability, and availability.
The actual effectiveness of the ILS TFtE program is not
completely known at this writing, however, benefits have
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been realized. For example, during the ILS T§E all mainte-
nance tasks are performed by Navy personnel utilizing pre-
liminary manuals. This provides the opportunity to evaluate
these manuals for completeness and accuracy in an operation-
al environment prior to fleet introduction.
B. FLOATING SUPPORT DATE
A major milestone in past acquisitions has been the date
the Navy assumes responsibility for the entire support of a
weapon system. In many cases design instability or major
changes have caused the milestone to be breached or has led
to inefficient use of scarce resources.
In recognition of the buildup of organic support that
naturally occurs in an acquisition process, a new concept
of a Floating Support Date was developed that allows for
the transition from contractor support to full Navy (organic)
support gradually as the design stabilizes. The major con-
cern is to have all the elements fall into place at the
right time.
Past experience has indicated that it is simply not
feasible to acquire support capability for all three levels
of maintenance at the same time unless all capability is
delayed until the longest lead capability (usually Depot)
is acquired. Such a delay is generally too costly.
Target dates for the Floating Support Date concept is
to acquire organizational level maintenance by Fleet Intro-
duction, intermediate level maintenance by the first deploy-
ment, and depot level as soon as needed. The acquisition of
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depot level will then become the Navy Support Date. In some
instances full Navy support will never be realized nor is it
necessarily desirable. With some items it is more economi-
cal to rely on contractor support than it is to acquire the
inhouse capability.
Implicit in the above discussion is the need for a sys-
tem to track all the items necessary for support on a system
by system and level of maintenance basis. It was discovered
that there are a variety of different Progress Evaluation
or Management Control Systems utilized throughout the govern-
ment, however, most are tailored to a specific purpose or
program. Therefore, the program under investigation developed
a Universal Network (UNINET) . It is basically a PERT output
that reflects a typical ILS program and includes all activ-
ities required to accomplish major logistic milestones. The
output from the network includes a brief description of the
system, a list of the variances, and a critical path analy-
sis with recommendations for the problems. Reports include
a Logistics Milestone Summary, Critical Path Report (total
float), and an Early Start Report by support element.
The universal net can be easily mechanized enabling the
manager to ask "what if" type questions and rapidly deter-
mine the impact of various alternative courses of action.
In addition, the net forces the contractor to establish the
necessary ILS interface requirements in his organization at
the very beginning of contract performance.
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C. RESIDENT INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT DETACHMENT
Perhaps the single most important feature impacting on
the success of the program investigated was the establish-
ment of a Resident Integrated Logistic Support Detachment.
It is comprised of experienced technicians from Fleet activ-
ities who physically reside in the contractor's plant. The
RILSD is directly responsible to the ILSMT chairman and is
responsive to" the ILSMT members of each functional element
for matters pertaining to the government technical review
and approval of contractor developed ILS requirements. The
detachment is administratively responsible to the NAVPRO in
all matters concerning the detachment's relations with the
contractor. The relationship between the NAVPRO and RILSD
is expressed in more detail in the case study, (Appendix A),
The RILSD was established in recognition of the need
for on-site representative to provide expertise on Navy
in-house maintenance and carrier operations to the contract-
or. The contractor had previously built aircraft for the
Navy but was relatively inexperienced in carrier operations,
As the RILSD chairman stated, "The contractor's basic un-
familiarity with carrier/maintenance and real world con-
straints frequently leads to 'cock-roach' solutions to
support requirements."
Composition of the detachment is crucial to its effec-
tiveness. Not only is there a requirement for a top tech-
nician but the necessary multiple interface dictates a need
for personality orientation. The first thoughts of NAVAIR
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was that the detachment should be staffed with engineers to
provide the same technical expertise as the contractor and
therefore more capable of discussing technical problems.
The NAVPRO visualized the detachment's role in a different
perspective. Although an engineer himself, he felt the
RILSD was not there to solve problems that the contractor
was paid to solve. What he expected of the detachment was to de
fine problems that the Fleet would experience in maintaining
the aircraft. Through his insistence the detachment compo-
sition included a LCDR/1520 (Aeronautical Maintenance Duty
Officer) as chairman and four Chief Petty Officers from
fleet activities operating similar aircraft from the decks
of a carrier.
Obviously ail aspects and activities of the RILSD can
not be reported on in this study. In the interest of pro-
viding a historical base for future programs, just a few
of the more salient points are covered.
The first of these is the selection criteria/qualifica-
tions of the detachment personnel. The chairman had come
up through the ranks, bringing with him fifteen years ex-
perience in aircraft maintenance. Additionally, he was a
candidate for a Ph.D. in Industrial Engineering. The Chief
Petty Officers were selected through a competitive process
conducted by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Out of twelve
hundred applicants for the billets, only four were selected.
Additionally, the detachment members agreed to accept orders
back to fleet activities operating' the aircraft and therefore
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had a large stake in the supportability of the end item.
See Exhibit 12, Appendix A.
The importance of Fleet experience to the designer dur-
ing the design and development phases is difficult to over-
state. The fact that the RILSD team entered the evolution
late in this program suboptimized its success. • The RILSD
was chartered nine months after the contract was signed,
however, the permanent staff of Fleet personnel was not
identified until one year later or nineteen months into the
aircraft design. The "mock-up" reviews had already been
conducted with limited Fleet input in which to influence
the supportability of design. For example, aircraft on a
carrier are normally parked with their tail section over
the deck edge in the interest of deck space, yet some pre-
flight inspection access panels were placed on the tail
section and could not be pre-flighted. Fleet input at this
stage could have corrected such errors.
Included in the RILSD charter was approval authority for
MEA reviews. In past programs this review was conducted by
engineers in AIR-411 and accomplished through correspon-
dence with the contractor. The review consisted of compar-
ing the maintenance plan contained in the MEA with a set of
drawings also provided by the contractor/vendor. In con-
trast, the approach taken by the RILSD was to perform the
actual maintenance action on production equipment and com-
pare the results with the plan contained in the MEA. This
procedure results in a more realistic support plan as the
aircraft moves into fleet introduction.
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Another highly successful innovation initiated by the
RILSD was in the area of training. The normal procedure is
to have training included in the contract as a line item
deliverable to the Navy sometime prior to Fleet introduc-
tion. Past experience has indicated that there is a con-
siderable time lag from receipt of the actual course
materials, devices, etc. and the time the training detach-
ment is prepared to realistically train fleet operating
squadrons. The approach taken by RILSD was to augment
their team with prospective instructors from NAMTGRU who
would participate in the preparation of the training ma-
terials to insure they tracked with maintenance require-
ments. As a result, the maintenance training packages were
timely and better reflected Fleet needs.
As a final note on the RILSD concept, the authors could
locate no one during the investigation for this study that
did not receive some benefit from the detachment, including
the contractor. Most were highly enthusiastic about it,
in fact, the majority of those interviewed willingly ac-




During the process of interviewing various ILS managers
for the case study material, some important viewpoints re-
lating to ILS were highlighted. It was felt by the authors
that the opinions of these experienced individuals should be
synthesized and reported in this chapter so that potential
ILS managers might benefit from lessons learned.
Looking back into history it has to be concluded that
there has always been logistic support, but what is new in
the current emphasis on ILS is the influence of this support
on hardware design. Webster defines integration as the pro-
cess of bringing parts together into a whole. In consonance
with this definition, the goal of ILS is to develop a plan
which will bring together all the elements necessary for
the support of the end item.
The typical ILS plans, at least in NAVAIR, are function-
ally organized, as are the " ious ILSMT's which administer
the plans. This planning and management by functional logis-
tic elements does not result in integrated support. The ILS
Implementing Guide for DoD Systems and Equipment (NAVMAT-
4000) recognizes that early planning must be deferred until
the configuration of the hardware has been reasonably sta-
bilized, however, if offers no guidance as to how and when




The detailed planning required for support of a new
weapon system cannot reasonably be done at the weapon sys-
tem level as currently attempted under existing directives.
It appears logical to break the weapon system down into man-
ageable packages and conduct detailed ILS planning by or-
ganic support capability on a system by system basis.
Organic support capability will only exist when all required
elements are available for a particular repair level.
The desired policy for ILS planning should be to attain
an in-house support capability prior to the first operation--
al deployment. This is not a capability that can be develop-
ed overnight. As. one ILS manager put it, "The best way to
eat an elephant is a little at a time. Since ILS planning
is also a mammoth undertaking, then why not look at acquir-
ing organic support capability a little at a time."
As a logical first step, logistic requirements analysis
needs to be conducted at the very beginning in order to
identify support requirements. The major deficiencies ex-
perienced to date have been the subjectiveness of applied
judgement in the analysis. A description of logistics anal-
ysis given by one author is "the arithmetic manipulation of
applied judgement." If this definition is true and the ap-
plied judgement is questionable, then the results of the
analysis is also suspect. Currently the questions relative
to support are not being answered satisfactorily because
the judgement that raised the question is seldom satisfied
by the judgement that formed the foundation of the analysis.
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As an example, the MTBF is an important parameter of a pro-
visioning decision, yet the number assigned to the MTBF is
often just an educated guess by the manufacturer and, there-
fore, the provisioning decision itself is suspect.
Identification of support requirements is just a begin-
ning. There needs to be a planning/tracking system which
will depict interrelationships and interdependencies of the
various elements. What is lacking in current directives is
a system which indicates logistic requirements by support
level on a system by system basis. Without such a system
there will never be integration, for there is no tool avail-
able to the logistics manager that allows him to intelli-
gently determine what effect changes (proposed or actual) in
one logistic element may have on the other.
The MEA approach is an attempt to provide an integrating
force for logistics planning. As stated earlier in this
study, the main value of the MEA is to provide a common data
base for the functional organizations and to force the con-
tractor to utilize an analytical approach to planning and
requirements determination. It still does not answer the
question of how to plan for the accomplishment of organic
support capability.
Perhaps it is time to be more innovative in the planning
process. First, admit that there is going to be an interim
support period and then plan for the orderly transition to
full Navy support. This suggests that ILS planning achieves
organic support by degrees. That is, procurement of organiza-
tional level support requirements, training, manuals, and
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spares would all be based on acquiring these at the same
time. Procurement of intermediate level support would be
planned so all elements would be available at a support site
on the intermediate level support date. The same type of
planning would be done for depot level and this would be-
come the Navy Support Date (NSD) for the weapon system.
What is needed to support this logical approach is a
set of charts for each level of support with milestones
depicted for each of the required elements. The logistics
manager will then have the visibility to determine the pac-
ing element and make appropriate decisions to the commence-
ment of work in each element area.
Commensurate with the above discussion, it is important
that the dates not be locked in concrete. There must be
flexibility to change major ILS milestones based upon tech-
nical programs and availability of data. As expressed by
one ILS manager, "It is better to be late with quality
manuals than on time with inadequate ones."
A basic part of past failures to provide adequate logis-
tic support has its origins in the inability to accurately
predict actual failure rates. Decisions are required
early in the development cycle concerning whether to plan
to discard an item or to repair it. If the decision favors
repair, at what level should the repair be accomplished?
From a combined economic/technical analysis there are
certain items that clearly fit into discard or repair cate-
gories, and decisions for these are easy to make. The
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logistics manager is then faced with attempting to choose
the least risk alternative for those items for which the
analyses leaves the repair/discard decision unclear. If
an erroneous decision to discard an item is made and then
is later changed to repair, there is a considerable time
lag in providing organic repair capability.
The least risk alternative appears to arbitrarily make
the repair decision and limit the contractor's work on the
item. The merits of an arbitrary repair decision is that
if it becomes necessary to change the decision later, it
is easier to change from repair to discard than from dis-
card to repair. It allows flexibility in finalizing repair/
discard decisions. An early decision to repair would per-
mit procurement of all repair/provisioning data during the
competitive time frame and avoid placing the government in
a "seller's market" later in the aircraft's life cycle.
An obstacle to the integration of logistics support is
the unwillingness or inability of people to go outside their
respective spheres of authority/responsibility to surmount
the rigid adherence to functional structure and get in-
volved in what other individual's are planning or doing.
Integration cannot be achieved at the top of the pyramid.
It must take place at the working level.
Navy projects basically depend upon existing organiza-
tions and activities for logistics support. The ILS manager
is therefore forced to manage across functional blocks within
his parent organization and across organizational lines with
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respect to outside organizations. Those functional elements
are also supporting other activities of their parent or-
ganization. When personnel are not available to support
all these demands, the ILS manager finds less responsiveness
than desired from the functional elements. His situation is
made even more difficult because the functional elements
were there long before his program started and will be there
long after his program ends.
Another aspect of this problem is the tendency of the
functional specialists to see their discipline as the cen-
tral core of a successful program. Their commitment to
their functional specialty leads them to attempt to dictate
what will be done as distinguished from advising what should
be done. One of the most difficult concepts to put across
to functional specialists is that the ILS manager is respon-
sible for determining what will be done. The functional
specialist is responsible for how it is done, the how being
his area of expertise.
As presently practiced, it is conjectured that a pro-
gram manager has a built-in conflict that must be resolved
if maximum utility is to be achieved in major programs. He
has as a prime objective, to support the needs of the Fleet.
This implies that the major emphasis must be concentrated
in providing equipment with the performance necessary to
meet a threat and the equipment must be available within a
specific time frame. Furthermore, congressional scrutiny
of the defense budget has been less severe in the operational
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and maintenance (OJJM) area than in procurement (PAMN)
.
Clearly the individual program manager's evaluations, and
hence, the driving force, is performance and schedule, not
support. There is no way to achieve optimum support for a




APPENDIX A: THE SRA REPAIR/DISCARD CASE
Commander Jim Kirk, the Assistant Program Manager for
Logistics (APML) on the A-13 Wildcat Project, was deeply
concerned that a definite support plan for the avionics
shop replaceable assemblies (SRA) had not yet been estab-
lished. Jim was chairing an A-13 maintenance plan review
conference which had commenced on March 3, 1972 and had
been in session for two days. The SRA support plan had
been one of Jim's major concerns since his appointment to
the position of APML in January 1971. To complicate mat-
ters, over eighty percent of the SRA's were being designed
by the contractor without diagnostic test points and would
be difficult to repair with presently planned test equip-
ment. The Navy Support Date had to be met by late 1974, so
Commander Kirk's purpose in scheduling this conference was
to evaluate his alternatives and develop a definite SRA
support plan. Jim was also under pressure from the pro-
gram manager, Captain Regal, who was awaiting his decision.
BACKGROUND OF A-13 PROJECT
The A-13 Wildcat was an all-weather, carrier based at-
tack aircraft being designed and produced by Defense Air-
craft Corporation (DAC) for the Navy under a fixed price
incentive contract. The contract was awarded to DAC in
January 1970 after close competition among several bidders.
When the A-13 was going through its early stages of concept
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formulation and contract definition the concept of Integrated
Logistics Support was given a great deal of emphasis by the
Department of Defense. The RFP reflected this emphasis by
requiring the contractor to submit an ILS management plan as
part of the proposal. This plan was the contractor's pro-
posed effort to achieve and insure maintainability design
and logistic subsystem integration to the degree required
to meet the stated operational use and support of the entire
weapon system.
During the source selection process the contractor's
proposed ILS plans were thoroughly evaluated by an ILS
evaluation team which consisted of a group of individuals
from NAVAIR, ASO , Navy Laboratories, and other support ac-
tivities .
Navy A-13 ILS Organization
The A-13 APML was given equal status to the other func-
tional assistants to the program manager. This relationship
is shown in Exhibit 1. The APML was directly responsible
to the A-13 program manager for the organization, implemen-
tation, and management of the A-13 ILS program. He was also
responsible to his functional superior in the Logistic/Fleet
Support branch in NAVAIR since he was functionally assigned
to that organization. The APML was assisted by element
managers who were also assigned to their respective func-
tional divisions. (See Exhibit 2.)
A significant amount of interface was required between
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(APMA) and their functional assistants in NAVAIR. Although
both the Material Acquisition and Fleet Support/Logistics
branches were physically located in the Washington, D. C.
area, they were separated by a distance of several miles.
An Integrated Logistics Support Management Team (ILSMT)
was established to provide a forum for coordinating support
activities and requirements between the NAVAIRSYSCOM and
associated Navy commands with A-13 support responsibilities,
and with the contractor. The APML served as chairman of
the ILSMT. The ILSMT was responsible to him for effective
monitoring and implementation of the ILS plan. All of the
logistics element managers were members of the team in ad-
dition to other representatives which the APML considered
appropriate. (See Exhibit 3.) The contractor also had a
similar team with a counterpart for each Navy member. The
complete ILSMT consisting of both Navy and contractor mem-
bers met at periodic intervals, usually every six months.
(See Exhibit 4.) Exhibits 5 and 6 depict the ILSMT role
and a typical meeting which was usually separated into sub-
committees
.
A NAVPRO was on-site at the contractor's plant which
was located on the West Coast. The NAVPRO administered the
A-13 contract in addition to another major aircraft contract
already in progress.
After a few months into the design phase, Pete Masson,
the first APML, had felt that an on-site ILS team in addi-
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the A-13. Through Pete's persistence and with the backing
and support of the NAVPRO head, Captain Green, a Resident
Integrated Logistics Support Detachment (RILSD) was estab-
lished in June 1970. The objective of the RILSD was to
provide a permanent team of highly qualified fleet personnel
with "wrench turning" experience who would have day-to-day
contact with the contractor. Initial assignment of person-
nel to the RILSD consisted of the chairman, Lieutenant Jim
Smith, from NAVPRO who was assisted by temporary members
from various support commands and activities until permanent
membership could be assigned from BUPERS . The management
relationships, functions, and responsibilities of the RILSD
are outlined in Exhibit 7.
Contractor A-13 ILS Organization
Defense Aircraft Corporation had responded to the Navy's
emphasis on ILS by elevating the A-13 ILS manager to the
position of A-13 Assistant Program Manager-ILS (APM-ILS).
The contractor's ILS organization is depicted in Exhibit 8.
The APM-ILS was established as the counterpart to the APML
on the Navy side of the program. He was the focal point
for A-13 contracts relating to ILS, and had the responsi-
bility for planning, directing and controlling company-wide
efforts to develop and implement A-13 ILS plans.
The APM-ILS served a dual role similar to the Navy APML
in that he reported to the contractor A-13 program manager
and also to his functional superior, the director for




MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIPS, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
RELATING TO THE
RESIDENT INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT DETACHMENT
1. Management Relationships . The following relationships
are established:
a. With the NAVPRO :
(1) The RILSD will be administratively attached to
the NAVPRO for all matters relating to contract performance
and progress, government/contractor liaison, and technical
surveillance of the contractor's support program development
effort. As such, the RILSD will operate with the local ad-
ministrative procedures established for the NAVPRO. The
RILSD will report concurrently to the NAVPRO and to the
Chairman, ILSMT.
(2) Any communication prepared by the RILSD in-
volving issuance of direction, authorization, or contract
interpretation to the contractor will be issued only by the
appropriate signature authority within the NAVPRO organiza-
tion.
(3) The NAVPRO will keep the RILSD advised on all
technically related contractual matters which affect
logistic support.
b. With NAVAIR :
(1) The RILSD shall be under the technical direc-
tion of the Chairman, ILSMT for matters directly affecting
the A-13 logistics support program. However, RILSD mem-
bers shall also be responsive to their parent commands for
those logistic program procedures and functions for which
the parent commands have cognizance.
c
.
With the Contractor :
(1) RILSD personnel are authorized direct liaison
with appropriate contractor personnel to provide technical
guidance in the specific logistic support element areas
such as Navy in-house maintenance capabilities, support
personnel requirements, provisioning procedures and re-
quirements, technical documentation and support equipment
requirements. However, this authorization shall not be
interpreted as authority to change or alter contractual
requirements or commitments. Recommendations or require-
ments for such actions shall be transmitted to or through




2. Functions and Responsibilities. The RILSD shall:
a. Assure that MEA procedures are employed effectively
in the development of a comrephensive and economical logis-
tic support system for the A-13 weapon system. This re-
sponsibility shall include the review of support requirements
and data developed for and by the MEA process, the necessary
coordination of the data, and the technical approval of such
data for acceptance by the Government. MEA data to be re-
viewed, coordinated, and approved for Government acceptance
includes
:
(1) Maintainability and reliability program data
inputs to the MEA process relating to or affecting support
requirements
.
(2) Level of repair decisions.
(3) Organizational, intermediate, and depot level
maintenance requirements and tasks including performance time
(4) System, subsystem, and component maintenance
plans
.
(5) Ground support equipment requirements for all
maintenance levels.
(6) Input data for technical manuals.
(7) Personnel requirements data and personnel plan-
ning summary.
(8) Maintenance training requirements.
(9) Repair parts requirements.
(10) Provisioning documentation requirements includ-
ing source, maintenance, and recoverability coding.
b. Review and approve the Support Material Lists and
ensure that the required material is ordered through the
NAVPRO
.
c. Monitor Government furnished equipment requirements
for support of the A-13 program.
d. Monitor the Component Pilot Rework/Repair Program and




e. Report known or anticipated deficiencies in logistics
support requirements to the Chairman, ILSMT and maintain























































































































































depicted in Exhibit 8. Appropriate managers in the divisions
acted as counterparts to the Navy members on the ILSMT.
SRA BACKGROUND
A shop replaceable assembly (SRA) is an avionics pack-
age or module contained within a larger avionics component
called a weapon replaceable assembly (WRA) . A WRA is com-
posed entirely of SRA's. (See Exhibit 9.) The avionics
maintenance concept for the A- 13 is that the avionics com-
ponents be designed so that a faulty WRA can be quickly and
easily replaced on the aircraft at the organizational level
of maintenance. The faulty WRA can then be sent to the
intermediate maintenance activity (IMA) where the malfunc-
tioning SRA can be detected and replaced with the use of
automatic test equipment. (See Exhibit 10.)
The A- 13 contract included the specification that the
avionics equipment would be designed in accordance with the
guidelines set forth in aeronautical requirements AR-10A,
General Requirements for Maintainability of Avionics Equip-
ment and Systems. This specification outlined the maintain-
ability and built-in test (BIT) requirements for avionics
equipment. It also specified the guidelines by which avionics
circuits were to be modularized to provide SRA's and WRA ' s
.
The applicable portion of AR-10A which referred to modular
design read as follows:
"Circuits shall be packaged into discrete replaceable
modules of such cost and reliability that disposal-on-
failure rather than module repair is the most cost
effective logistic support action. Performance, op-
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functional use, supply support, equipment cost, fault
isolation, repair cost, and equipment availability are
typical trade-off factors to be considered whether a
module shall have several or many microelectronic cir-
cuits, discrete component parts, etc. Any module
costing 500 dollars or less, having a reliability of
50,000 hours or greater MTBF shall be designed for
disposal -on-failure . Other modules require procuring
activity approval if the module is to be designed as
non- repairable .
"
Since the A- 13 avionics system was to be composed of
approximately 1300 SRA's, it was extremely important that
the criteria used to categorize an SRA as repairable or
discard-on-failure was clear and well understood by the
prime contractor and his suppliers. Also of major impor-
tance was the fact that SRA's designed to be repairable
would require diagnostic test points built into the design.
These diagnostic test points were required to make the SRA
compatible with VAST (Versatile Avionics Shop Tester)
.
VAST is a sophisticated automatic test station capable of
testing avionics equipment from several aircraft types.
VAST stations are installed at IMA's aboard aircraft car-
riers and shore stations. SRA's designed as discard-on-
failure also required compatibility with VAST, but only
end-to-end (go/no-go) test points were necessary. The rea-
son for requiring end-to-end test capability on discard-
on-failure SRA's was to provide a means of verifying whether
or not the unit is bad so as to prevent discarding SRA's
with no fault.
Two months after the contract was awarded, Defense Air-
craft Corporation submitted a proposal to amend AR-10A for
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specific application to the A-13 avionics system. DAC had
been anxious to obtain NAVAIR approval of the proposed ap-
plication so they could provide their subcontractors with
guidance in designing SRA's. The 'following amendment to
AR-10A was approved and incorporated into the detailed
specifications
:
"Circuits shall be packaged into discrete replaceable
modules of such cost and reliability that disposal-on-
failure rather than module repair is the most cost ef-
fective logistic support action. Performance, operability,
design complexity, reliability, system life, functional
use, supply support, equipment cost, fault isolation,
repair costs, and equipment availability are typical
trade-off factors to be considered when determining
whether a module shall have several or many microelec-
tronic circuits, discrete component parts, etc. All
modules from equipments requiring VAST compatibility
whether repairable or non-repairable will be designed
to permit an end-to-end test using VAST. Figure A-l
shall be utilized to determine whether VAST compatible
equipment modules (SRA's and sub -SRA's) shall be
designed to permit fault isolation to the component
level using VAST. Modules falling on or to the left
of the 1 cent per MTBF-HR line will be designed for
end-to-end testing only. Modules falling on the 3
cents per MTBF-HR line or to the right of that line
shall be designed for VAST testing to the component
level. Modules costing in excess of one (1) cent and
less than three (3) cents per MTBF-HR will be analyzed
in depth to determine if design shall include testing
to the component level by VAST. A design for repair
to component level is indicated when life cycle cost
of repair is 90 percent, or less, of throwaway life
cycle cost. The following formulae shall be used in
the computation of life cycle cost analysis:
Life Cycle Failures
= Life Cycle Failures
N., x N. x N D x L rM A B L
MTBF
N,. = Number identical modules per aircraftM r
N. = Number operational aircraft (144)
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= Life cycle in months (120)
NM x 144 x 150 x 120
MTBF
= Life cycle failures = N
p
Life Cycle Cost Estimate Per Module *
C = C + C + CL
T
L
P MP L S
Cp = VAST software programming cost$14,000 Throwaway Basis
$35,000 Repair Basis
CMp = Manpower cost of technician at $9/Hour$13.50 each failure - throwaway basis x Np$27.00 each failure - repair basis x Np
Cq = Spare/Repair parts cost + cost per line
Item in allowance list/IPB
$50.00 repair parts, each failure - repair basis
$1000.00 per line item at $100 per year for 10 years
Estimated number line items for repairable modules:
6 line items, module cost less than $200
10 line items, module cost $200 - $499
15 line items, module cost $500 - $899
20 line items, module cost $900 - $1399
25 line items, module cost $1400 - $2000
*Cost of Design for Test Points not Included.
Life Cycle Throwa\vay Cost
[$13.50 x N
p
+ $15,000 + (N
F
x Mp)]1.3 = Life Cycle Throw-'
away Cost
$13.50 = Manpower Cost
Np = Number Life Cycle Failures
$15,000 = VAST Software Programming Cost
($14,000 + 1 Line Item ($1,000))
M~ = Module Cost, Each
1.3 = Operation and Maintenance Costs
(Navy Developed per RFP)
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Life Cycle Repair Cost
[$77 x N c + $35,000 + (L x $1000) + (0.1 N x M)]1.3
r
= Life Cycle Repair Cost
$77 Manpower Cost = ($27) + Spare/Repair Cost ($50)
Np = Number Life Cycle Failures
$35,000 = VAST Software Programming Cost
L = Number Line Items (Module + Repair Parts)
0.1N = Spare Modules (10% Total Failures)
M„ = Module Cost, Each
1.3 = Operation and Maintenance Costs.
Mean-Time-Between Failure (MTBF) shall be established for
electronic modules utilizing the reliability stress and
failure rate data specified in MIL-HDBK-217A and the Rome
Air Development Center (RADC) workbook Volume II. (Qual-
ity adjustment factors for lower grade parts shall be
used where applicable.) For components not covex'ed in
above references, MTBF's may also be established on
the basis of failure rates suitably substantiated by
test and field data and as modified for the intended
operational environments and usage time period. Module
MTBF's reflecting the above data shall be indicated on
the cost worksheets submitted in accordance with pro-
visions herein. When handbooks other than the above
two are used to compute MTBF's, a source data worksheet
summary shall be provided along with the cost worksheet.
Cost of modules will be those cost of spare equipments
procured under Lot V of the A-13 contract.
It is desired that to the maximum practical extent
modules designed for throwaway as defined above be
designed so that, if repair of the module, at some
point in time, becomes economically viable, the equip-
ment may be repaired using test equipment, not neces-
sarily VAST. When a conformal coating is used it shall
be a type which is easy to remove and reapply. In any
event, not more than 2 percent of the total SRA's
(modules) shall be made unrepairable (i.e., potted in
such a manner as to preclude repair)
,
A life cycle cost worksheet (see Figure A-2) shall be
prepared for all applicable modules, and a copy will be
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Deviation to the above criteria will be subject to
NAYAIR approval."
Pete Masson, the First A-13 APML , had recognized the
criticality of a throwaway decision because once the SRA
was designed for throwaway, it could not be repaired using
VAST since the fault could not be detected without the auto-
matic test points. For this reason the AR-10A amendment in-
cluded the stipulation that to the maximum possible extent,
SRA's designed for throwaway be designed so that, if repair
of the module at some point in time became economically
viable, the equipment could be repaired using some type of
test equipment, not necessarily VAST.
A few months after Commander Kirk assumed the role of
A-13 APML he began to show concern about the increasing
number of "throwaway recommended" SRA life cycle cost work-
sheets which were being forwarded to NAVAIR in accordance
with AR-10A. Jim felt that the contractor was designing
too many SRA's for throwaway. He displayed his feelings
one day while talking with one of his logistics element man-
agers by saying, "I just can't believe that it's economical
or practical to throwaway eighty percent of our SRA's when
they fail. If we develop a support plan based on this
philosophy, the aircraft carrier will have to tow a barge
behind it to carry the spares. The vendors can make a mint
on repairing the throwaways and selling them back to us."
Commander Kirk felt that the SRA issue needed more
exposure. He wanted to make sure that the A-13 avionics
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system was supportable when the aircraft entered the fleet.
As an experienced fleet aviator and aircraft maintenance
manager, he did not want to see some of his support problems
with previous aircraft repeated with the A-13. He planned
to emphasize the issue at the next ILSMT conference.
APRIL ILSMT CONFERENCE
On April 3, 1971 an ILSMT conference was held at the
contractor's plant. Two major items on the agenda were the
SRA's and the A-13 mock-up reviews. The A-13 had been in
the design stage for over a year and mock-up reviews were
already in process. These mock-up reviews were the first
hardware form to be evaluated for maintainability. The pur-
pose of a mock-up review is to evaluate the qualitative fea-
tures of the design such as accessibility, simplicity, work
environment, resource requirements, man-machine interface,
and arrangement and location of the components.
As the conference proceded on the SRA issue it became
evident that there was no consensus among the Navy and con-
tractor personnel as to which direction to proceed in es-
tablishing a support plan. While discussing the matter with
Joe Harris, the contractor APM-ILS, Commander Kirk presented
the view that AR-10A should never have been interpreted as a
level-of -repair analysis as it appeared the contractor had
done. The real objective of AR-10A was to guide the design
of the SRA's so that excess weight and size could be held to
a minimum by not designing diagnostic test points into SRA's
which were clearly uneconomical to repair. Commander Kirk
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strongly commented that he had very little confidence in
the MTBF's that some of the suppliers were predicting of
their SRA's. On some of the high cost SRA's the predicted
MTBF's were high enough to drive the cost to less than one
cent per MTBF-HR, causing them to be placed in the throw-
away category.
Joe Harris defended the methods by which the SRA's had
been classified by reminding Jim that the Navy had given
full approval to the methodology which was used. Joe
pointed out that it was beneficial for the Navy to accept
a throwaway decision even if they considered the data to
support a definite decision to be lacking. He reasoned that
a throwaway decision would avoid the cost of setting in mo-
tion the establishment of repair capabilities, such as test
equipment, maintenance manuals, etc. He further emphasized
the fact that SRA's were composed of micro-miniaturized
circuits of high component density which are difficult, if
not impossible to repair, especially at the intermediate
level of maintenance.
To counter Joe's point in the nonrepairability aspects
of micro -miniaturization , Jim Kirk noted a report that a
micro-miniaturized circuit repair kit had recently been
introduced on the market and might have possibilities for
minor local repair at the intermediate level. He further
remarked that SRA's which had no diagnostic test points
could possibly be repaired by manually probing.
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In an effort to obtain more information on the issue,
Jim requested comments and recommendations from the ILSMT
members. He was specifically interested in the impact that
a decision to repair the SRA's locally would have on the
A-13 support plan. The major impact areas discussed were:
(1) There would be a time lag to acquire full repair
capability. In other words, local avionics repair would
have to be achieved first at the WRA level and later at
the SRA level.
(2) Additional data requirements in the areas of
training, repair, and provisioning would be generated.
(3) Additional automatic test equipment would be re-
quired.
(4) Procurement of many additional repair parts (bits
and pieces) would be required.
It was clear to Commander Kirk that the finalized SRA
support plan should not be an arbitrary decision. An ap-
portunity to obtain additional information on which to base
a decision was provided by the maintainability committee
which recommended that a level -of -repair analysis using
AR-60 (Level-of -Repair for Aeronautical Material) be per-
formed on the SRA's. AR-60 had recently been issued by
NAVAIR and the committee felt that the results of an anal-
ysis using the AR-60 model would produce a higher level of
confidence than AR-10A was providing on repair/discard
decisions. Commander Kirk agreed and made plans to obtain
funding for the study from the program manager.
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In the meantine some guidance was necessary for the
contractor in preparing Maintenance Engineering Analysis
(MEA) exhibits for the throwaway designed SRA's. The ILSMT
conference adjourned with Commander Kirk emphasizing that
the SRA's could not be considered "consumable" until such
time that a final decision could be made as to whether an
SRA should, in fact, be discarded at failure. NAVAIRSYSCOM
subsequently issued a letter to all concerned parties de-
lineating the Navy policy on SRA's. (See Exhibit 11.)
Upon Commander Kirk's return to Washington after the
ILSMT conference, he briefed the program manager on the
topics discussed and summarized the status of the A-13 ILS
program. Captain Regal agreed to fund the level-of -repair
analysis using the AR-60 model which the ILSMT recommended
and subsequently notified the contractor to submit a pro-
posal describing the methodology to be used in conducting
the analysis. It was understood that the results of the
analysis were to be used only for consideration by the pro-
gram manager and APML to assist them in making a decision
on a definitive SRA plan since AR-10A was still the con-
tractual document driving the design of the SRA's.
In June 1971, DAC submitted their proposal and was funded
$160,000 to conduct the analysis.
RILSD BUILDUP
As of June 1971 the RILSD was still comprised of tem-
porary members, but it was apparent that permanent member-





From: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
To: Distribution List
Subj : Disposition of A-13 Avionic SRA's (Shop Replaceable
Assemblies) Designed for Disposal-on-Failure
;
policy concerning
Ref: (a) NAVPRO Westville 0813072 Feb 1971
(b) AR-10A as amended for A-13
(c) AR-60
1. Reference (a) requested NAVAIR's guidance for DAC in
preparing MEA (Maintenance Engineering Analysis) exhibits
for those SRA's which are being designed to meet the dis-
posal-on-failure criteria contained in reference (b)
.
2. Background: Reference (b) directs that circuits shall
be packaged into discrete replaceable modules of such cost
and reliability that disposal -on- failure rather than module
repair is the most cost effective logistic support action.
Reference (b) also expressed the desire that to the maximum
practical extent modules designed for throw-away be de-
signed so that, if repair of the module at some point in
time becomes economically viable, the equipment may be re-
paired using test equipment, not necessarily VAST. The
intent of reference (b) was to provide a screening tech-
nique which would provide the basis for determining which
VAST compatible SRA's should be designed for VAST testing
to the component level and which should be designed only
for VAST end-to-end testing.
3. Discussion: Since the criterion of reference (b) in-
cludes SRA's with high unit cost, the question has been
raised of whether the government can, in fact, consider
these high cost SRA's "consumable" until operational data
can verify the validity of predicted cost/reliability rates.
An analysis in accordance with reference (c) will hopefully
commence in the near future and should produce higher con-
fidence discard/repair and level of repair decisions. In
the meantime, as discussed at the third ILSMT Conference
held April 1971, interim provisions must be made to retain
these failed "consumable" SRA's at a suitable stocking point








a. DAC will recommend on the applicable MEA exhibits
the Uniform Source, Maintenance and Recoverability code
which will insure that no repair is authorized on the
disposal-on-failure SRA's and the lowest maintenance level
authorized to condemn them is the depot level. Repair
data and parts breakdown will not be required from the
SRA vendor but would be obtained at a later date for those
SRA's which are subsequently coded repairable. Reversals
in the maintenance concept on these items could well in-
volve more cost than was originally envisioned, and there-
fore, must be held to a bare minimum. DAC will closely
scrutinize and audit their vendor's life cycle cost analy-
sis and other design factors which are the basis for the
repair decision to insure that the disposal -on- failure
decision is based on sound and valid criteria. Life cycle
cost worksheets required by reference (b) will be submitted
with DAC ' s recommendation and attendent rationale and jus-
tification for the repair/dispose decision. All presently
available life cycle cost worksheets shall be submitted to
the Naval Weapons Engineering Support Activity and the RILSD
upon receipt of these instructions. Subsequent submittals
of the life cycle cost worksheets shall be on a monthly basis
until all of the subject worksheets have been delivered to
the Navy.
b. NAVAIR will establish by separate action procedures
for the handling, storage and inventory control of the
failed subject SRA's at some suitable stocking point.
c. NAVAIR will establish procedures for the collection
and analysis of cost/failure data and make the final de-
cision whether to retain the dispose-on-failure code or to
establish repair capability by obtaining repair data,





The persistent efforts of the NAVPRO head, Captain Green,
resulted in the initial selection of four chief petty
officers and one lieutenant commander. (See Exhibit 12.)
The chairman, Lieutenant Commander Herb Barker had an im-
pressive background in aircraft maintenance. He had been
an aircraft maintenance officer in fleet activities for ten
years and was a candidate for a Ph.D. in Industrial Engineering
All four chiefs had carrier aircraft operations experience
and were familiar with typical fleet maintenance and sup-
port problems.
The RILSD office was located in the same building with
DAC Project Support personnel, causing some of the contrac-
tor personnel to have reservations about this close involve-
ment by the government. As detailed in its charter, one of
the primary purposes of the RILSD was to assure that Main-
tenance Engineering Analysis procedures were employed ef-
fectively by the contractor. Inspection and teardown of
hardware in conjunction with MEA reviews was considered
necessary by Herb Barker for the MEA's to be of any real
value. He was very disappointed to discover that this tear-
down and inspection had neither been planned for nor funded
by the project office. Herb was of the opinion that the
RILSD would be ineffective unless his chiefs had as much
access to the aircraft and major components as possible,
therefore, one of his first accomplishments was to convince
the APML and program manager to permit his team to visit






From: Naval Plant Representative Westville
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-100)
Via: (1) Naval Air Systems Command Representative, Pacific
(2) Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D. C.
Subj : Additional Staffing for A-13 Program; request for
1. The RILSD was established under charter from the Naval
Air Systems Command in June 1970. At this time the RILSD
is still without a permanent staff. Implicit in the RILSD
function of day-to-day direction of the contractor is the
requirement for continuity of that direction. This in turn
demands at least a semblence of "permanance" , which cannot
be attained with temporary members.
2. The majority of the members of the ILSMT have agreed to
the need for a permanent RILSD staff. The only objection
voiced was by NAVAIR personnel from the AIR-411 organization
who expressed reservations about local determinations (by
RILSD) on maintenance matters with the attendent by-passing
of "cognizant desks" in NAVAIRSYSCOMfAIR-04) . This reserva-
tion appears to be in direct conflict with the basic con-
cept of RILSD; i.e., the establishment of policy by NAVAIR
through the ILSMT and the delegation of authority and re-
sponsibility for its execution to the on-site RILSD. It
is believed that the RILSD, or something similar, is man-
datory if the A-13 ILS program is to be successful. Aug-
mentation of the military staffing of the NAVPRO for
approximately three years with fleet experienced personnel
would be a most effective means to implement it. In addi-
tion, the collateral benefit to the Navy of having a pre-
trained cadre of personnel to move with the weapon system
into operational squadrons would obviously be of tremendous
value. If compensating billets within the Shore Establish-
ment cannot be located, possibly Fleet activities could pro-
vide compensation, in view of the downstream pay-off of a
weapon system designed to account for the pragmatics of
"real-world" operations and maintenance plus Navy personnel
knowledgeable in depth to insure a smooth and effective
transition into Fleet service.
3. It is requested that the following augmented military














4. It should be obvious that the men selected should be
chosen with care. These men should be the best in their
rating groups in technical skill and experience, in
ability to express their thoughts clearly, and an ability
to work with people of other career patterns. It is
further considered highly desirable that wherever possible
turnover of representatives be held to a minimum.
5. When the tour of duty of the personnel is complete,
they should receive orders back to the Fleet where their
expertise in the A-13 would prove useful. The billet with
the RILSD should expire with the detachment of the incum-
bent, as the MEA-writing period would have been completed.
As these personnel detach, the RILSD itself would also be






teardown of each component. The APML , Jim Kirk, considered
the proposed visits valuable for two reasons. First, a
design review of the components would be beneficial in
conducting MEA reviews, and second, the visits would pro-
vide the opportunity for experienced Navy practitioners to
have a close look at the SRA's and make some judgement as
to their repairability at the intermediate maintenance level
The Navy's intent to conduct the Vendor visits was for-
mally announced in a letter to the prime contractor citing
as justification the A-13 aircraft specification which pro-
vided for design reviews to be conducted periodically during
contract performance. (See Exhibit 13.)
AR-60 STUDY COMPLETED
In February 1972 the AR-60 Level-of-Repair study was
completed and forwarded to the A-13 project office by DAC.
The result of the analysis revealed that approximately forty
percent of the SRA's would be more economical to repair than
discard. Comparing this to the AR-10A recommendations re-
sulted in 290 additional SRA's being recommended as repair-
able. However, in evaluating the results of the study,
Commander Kirk and Lieutenant Commander Barker were dismayed
to discover that some incorrect assumptions were made in
generating inputs to the computational model. For example,
the support equipment costs were based on the assumption
that all of the WRA's were composed of SRA's with diagnostic
test points. It was difficult to determine to what extent





From: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
To: Defense Aircraft Corporation
Via: Naval Plant Representative Office, Westville
Subj : Contract P00021-70-B-0538 ; A- 13 Weapon System Design
Reviews
Ref: (a) AS-6714
Encl : (1) Vendor Visit Schedules
1. Paragraph 3.2.8 of reference (a) states that formal design
reviews shall be conducted periodically during the course of
the A-13 contract.
2. A formal design review by cognizant Navy and DAC person-
nel is appropriate at this point in time in order to:
a. Evaluate maintainability of the system/sub-system/
equipments
.
b. Verify the maintenance plan.
c. Review recommended ground support equipment require-
ments
.
d. Select appropriate Component Pilot Rework/Repair
candidates
e. Observe progress toward design stability.
f. Review provisioning documentation requirements.
3. In order to expedite completion of the desired design
reviews, NAVAIR proposes to establish four teams for review










Each team which will be chaired by a representative of the
A-13 RILSD, will consist of cognizant DAC personnel, Fleet
personnel and representatives of other Navy commands.
4. The Contractor is requested to schedule design reviews
in accordance with enclosure (1) . Each vendor must be
prepared to provide the following:
a. Functional description in sufficient depth to allow
meaningful discussion of the vendor recommended maintenance
plan for organizational, intermediate and depot levels.
b. Review of vendor test/support equipment and recom-
mended GSE.
c. Inspection of hardware on the production line in
sufficient depth to permit correlation to Navy maintenance
skills and capabilities.
d. Recommended assembly/disassembly/rigging procedures,
e. Fault isolation/functional test procedures.
f. Calibration/adjustment requirements and procedures.
g. Technical manuals/data requirements (including
identification of proprietary data)
.
h. Spares and repair parts recommendation including
production lead times.
i. Recommendations concerning CPR/R packages.
j. Review of reliability data including study methods
and test results.
The proposed schedule may be modified as mutually agreed
by the Contractor and the Chairman, A-13 RILSD.
I. M. Regal,




decided that any decision based on the AR-60 study would
be deferred until after the vendor visits were conducted.
Jim expressed his frustration with the situation by saying,
"If the Navy would have done more level-of -repair analyses
prior to awarding the contract, we wouldn't have this prob-
lem of trying to make the right repair/discard decision.
I think it would have been better to design the SRA's to
be repairable, because it's a lot easier to change from
repairable to throwaway than from throwaway to repairable."
VENDOR VISITS
The tour of the major subcontractors began in May 1972.
Four teams were formed to conduct the visits. Each team was
headed by a chief petty officer from RILSD and included con-
tractor maintainability/supportability personnel and repre-
sentatives from the fleet and various Navy support activities
During the tour, the teams discovered the subcontractors
were very receptive to fleet interests and were generally
delighted to discuss their product with them. The engineers
were quite surprised to learn of the many constraints that
exist when operating from a Navy carrier at sea. At the con-
clusion of the tour, Herb Barker had mixed feelings. He was
now convinced that the permanent RILSD should have been es-
tablished earlier in the A-13 life cycle to have any mean-
ingful influence on the design. Once the components are in
production changes are difficult and expensive to make. Al-
though untimely from the design perspective, the visits did
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prove valuable to the RILSD from the standpoint of providing
data relative to the support requirements of the aircraft.
MAINTENANCE PLAN REVIEW CONFERENCE
Two weeks after the subcontractor visits were completed,
Commander Kirk scheduled a special A-13 maintenance plan
review conference at the contractors plant. Key individuals
associated with the SRA issue, including the deputy project
manager, were in attendance. His objective was- to consoli-
date all SRA data accumulated to date to assist him in mak-
ing a definitive SRA support plan decision. Time was running
out and he had to decide soon.
During the course of the meeting, all factors which
might contribute to the SRA support plan decision were
discussed. Reports from the teams which conducted the ven-
dor visits indicated that from a non-economical point of
view it was feasible to repair up to eighty percent of the
SRA's at the carrier intermediate maintenance activity if
adequate automatic test equipment was available. This was
not a unanimous opinion, however. The view of some of the
team members was that attempts to repair many of the SRA's
locally would result in further damage and reduced reli-
ability due to the close density of the components.
A few months earlier Commander Kirk had received addi-
tional information relating to WRA and SRA repair which com-
pounded the problem. Preliminary studies revealed that the
planned three station VAST complex aboard aircraft carriers
would not have adequate capacity to handle the WRA/SRA
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workload from all the on-board aircraft. Several other type
aircraft contained VAST supportable avionics systems and
this time limitation on VAST suggested that local repair
capability might be seriously affected unless supplemental
automatic test equipment was made available. In fact, the
contractor was already conducting a Navy funded study to
determine the extent of extra test equipment requirements.
This study included a look at the diagnostic requirements
for SRA's that had been designed without diagnostic test
points for possible inclusion into the design of supplemen-
tal automatic test equipment.
It was apparent that a decision to locally repair SRA's
which had been designed with only end-to-end test points
would require a substantial investment in additional auto-
matic test equipment. Commander Kirk still felt, however,
that a support philosophy driven by AR-10A would result in
eventual depletion of ready assets and excessive stockpiling
of units in a non-ready-for-issue (non RFI) status due to
the inability of intermediate maintenance activities to
repair.
During the maintenance plan review meeting, Herb Barker
presented an analytical technique he had developed by com-
bining some of the criteria of both AR-10A and AR-60 which
he felt would aid the repair/discard decision. The pro-
posal had a logical flow pattern that was well received by the
group, however the deputy program manager rejected the pro-
posal by saying, "We need answers, not more questions. Any
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more detailed analysis will be too time consuming and our
support money has to be obligated before the end of the
fiscal year."
Joe Harris, the contractor APM-ILS, commented on the
impact that any redirection from AR-10A support philosophy
would have on the current ILS support effort. He reminded
the group that AR-10A as amended for the A- 13 aircraft was
still the only contractual document by which the contractor
was guided and all WRA and SRA MEA's were still being per-
formed on that basis.
Commander Kirk evaluated his alternatives. If the AR-10A
support philosophy was retained the requirement for local
repair capability would be reduced. If the predicted MTBF's
were accurate the avionics reliability would be quite high.
However, the life cycle cost of procuring spares and keeping
them in the pipeline could escalate if the predicted MTBF's
were not achieved. AR-60, which was intended to provide
more confidence, was now suspect due to some false assump-
tions and incorrect inputs as far as the Navy was concerned.
The decision to repair the majority or the SRA's would re-
quire a substantial investment in additional automatic test
equipment, more stocking of bits and pieces, additional
maintenance engineering analysis on each SRA recoded as
repairable, additional training, and other possible un-
knowns. On the other hand, the ability to repair SRA's at
the local level should improve readiness and reduce the




1. The APML is faced with the problem of acquiring support
for the SRA's regardless of his decision to repair or dis-
card. What are some factors he should consider in each
case?
2. If you were the APML, what decision would you make re-
garding the SRA support plan?
3. Discuss the RILSD concept and the effect of its in-
volvement in the A- 13 program?
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